Qualitative research suggests that discrimination against minority groups precipitates terrorism in countries. This study adds to this body of research by determining which specific manifestations of minority discrimination-political, socioeconomic or culturalare important and substantive predictors of terrorist activity. To do so, I conduct a series of negative binomial estimations and substantive effects simulations on a cross-national dataset of terrorist attacks and the treatment of minority groups in four specific areas: political participation and representation, economic status, religious and language rights. The results indicate that socioeconomic discrimination against minorities is the only consistently significant and highly substantive predictor of terrorism. The study concludes by discussing the implications of these findings to the scholarly literature on terrorism.
potential predictor in the current generation of cross-national empirical literature on the root causes of terrorism.
In this study I examine the effects of discrimination against minority groups on patterns of terrorism afflicting countries and delve deeper to find out the relationship between specific manifestations of minority discrimination and terrorist attacks. I make two key findings: first, that countries containing minority groups that face general discrimination experience higher rates of transnational and domestic terrorist attacks. This provides empirical backing to the case study literature and reinforces the scant findings existent in the empirical literature. Second, I find that only some types of discrimination precipitate terrorism. Across all models, economic discrimination against minorities-explained in detail below as formal and informal barriers preventing minorities from having full access to economic opportunities-significantly and substantively increases the likelihood that a country will experience terrorist attacks. Political discrimination-formal and informal barriers preventing minorities from participating in or being represented in governance-is significant in some of the models, but is rendered insignificant when evaluated next to economic discrimination and bears a much smaller substantive effect on terrorism. The analysis also reveals that indicators of cultural discriminations-formal and informal restrictions on minority group religious practice and linguistic rights-are neither significant nor substantive predictors of terrorism.
The organization of this study is as follows. In the next section I trace the theoretical link between general discrimination against minorities and terrorism and focus on what the terrorism, comparative politics, and larger conflict literatures say about the effects of economic, political, and cultural manifestations of minority group discrimination on terrorist activity. I then move on to the empirical analyses, which involve a series of negative binomial regression models using data from the Minorities at Risk database (Minorities at Risk, 2009 ) and data on terrorist incidents from the Global Terrorism Database. I then produce and discuss the substantive effects of the four different types of minority group discrimination on terrorist attacks using Monte Carlo simulations. I conclude with a brief discussion of the theoretical import of these findings.
Discrimination Against Minorities as a Cause of Terrorism?
Why, generally speaking, should we expect discrimination against minorities to produce terrorism, and how might specific manifestations of discrimination precipitate terrorist activity? I answer this question by examining three theoretical arguments, grounded in various social science literatures, for why societies in which discrimination against minorities is a prominent feature might experience and produce more terrorism. All three theoretical arguments are premised on the assumption that experience of discrimination by minority groups both produces and reinforces a sense of collective identity among group members that they are distinct from the majority population or majority culture-fostering a sense of alienation or ''otherness''-while defining and making salient grievances among group members. When alienated and aggrieved minority groups are able to overcome collective action problems and mobilize, which is often facilitated by elites within the communities who can channel grievances, then political violence is more likely to occur (Gurr, 1996) . While Gurr's model linking otherness, grievance, and mobilization is mainly adapted to higher-intensity manifestations of mass political violence, like rebellions and riots, Crenshaw (1981) , Ross (1993) and Piazza (2011) explicitly link it to terrorism, and depict minority group marginalization and grievance as a crucial ingredient of terrorist group formation and terrorist activity.
This summary of the relevant literature leads to the first hypothesis tested in the study: H 1 : Countries containing minority groups facing discrimination will experience higher levels of terrorism.
In theory, however, alienation, grievance and minority group engagement in political violence can be triggered by different types of discrimination. I briefly describe each below.
Political Discrimination and Terrorism
This argument utilizes a rational-choice framework and also helps to make a case that political discrimination, in particular, is likely to prompt terrorist activity. Subgroups of citizens are assumed to be rational actors and discrimination a structural barrier to citizens' use of nonviolent, legal means to redress grievances and enact policy change. When a political system denies subgroups channels to seek redress, they have a higher probability of engaging in political behavior outside of the formal legal system and to engage in political violence (Crenshaw, 1981 (Crenshaw, , 1990 DeNardo, 1985) . This theoretical argument is state-centered, meaning that it considers qualities of the state, whether it is democratic or not, whether its leaders are responsive and accessible or not, as the key predictors of the likelihood of terrorism, and it also assumes that the terrorists will hail from aggrieved minority group communities. Crenshaw (1981: 383-384) offers an explicit description of the process where discrimination produces preconditions under which terrorist groups develop and become active. Population subgroups with concrete grievances-she specifically uses the example of ''ethnic minorities'' that are ''discriminated against by the majority population''-develop social movements which then agitate for policies to remedy their grievances. Typically, Crenshaw maintains, these demands involve either granting equal rights to all citizens or providing political autonomy to the aggrieved minority group. Out of these social movements come radical fringe elements that may resort to terrorist violence to achieve their goals. Whether or not they do so is also determined, according to Crenshaw, by whether or not they lack access to avenues for participation in the political process, and by what she terms ''precipitating events''. In the situation that government institutions prove to be unresponsive to the minority group's demands for redress, and when this intransigence is met with, for example, a sharp government crackdown or some sort of atrocity committed by government agents or majority group members, terrorism is more likely to ensue.
Empirical studies of terrorism have not, to date, tested Crenshaw's (1981 Crenshaw's ( , 1990 theories linking discrimination and lack of opportunity for minority groups to redress grievances within the political system and the incidence of terrorism. However, the conflict literature has thoroughly investigated the effects of minority grievances on political violence. Gurr's (1968) work on intra-state armed conflicts revealed that relative political deprivation, the inability of society to meet the expectations for political influence that subgroups acquire, was, among other predictors, a significant positive correlate for aggregate civil strife. In later works (1993, 1996, 2000) Gurr further developed his theory on this relationship arguing that grievances lead to group mobilization which then leads to violent rebellion. In this context, Gurr also explains that in properly functioning democratic regimes, rebellion is avoided because grievances are channeled into nonviolent political participation, and has seen this prong of his argument validated in several empirical studies (see, for example, Muller and Weede, 1990) . 1 In summary, this literature provides some evidence of a relationship between political discrimination against minority groups and general political violence. It leads to the second hypothesis tested in the analysis: H 2 : Countries exhibiting political discrimination against minority groups will experience more terrorism.
Socioeconomic Discrimination and Terrorism
The stream of literature on which this argument rests explains that exclusion from the mainstream socioeconomic life of a country, either as a result of discriminatory public policy or more informal barriers that relegate minorities to secondclass citizen status, breeds radicalism and a predilection for violence, including support for terrorism. Gurr's (1970 Gurr's ( , 1993 use of relative deprivation-a phenomenon whereby individuals become aggrieved when their material status does not match up to their expectations, partially set by the higher socioeconomic status of others in society-to explain the occurrence of political violence undergirds much of the broad theoretical framework linking socioeconomic deprivation suffered by minorities and terrorism. And, like the link between political discrimination and 1 It should be noted that Gurr's (1968) earlier empirical findings on political deprivation have not been consistently reproduced. Regan and Norton (2005) find political discrimination to be a significant predictor of civil war, but Gurr and Duvall (1973) , Ellina and Moore (1990) , and Gurr and Moore (1997) do not. Furthermore, a third set of studies find a more complex relationship between political discrimination and conflict that often depends on the interaction between political discrimination and other factors (Bonneuil and Auriat, 2000; Lichbach, 1987; Moore, 1998) .
Conflict Management and Peace Science 29(5) terrorism discussed earlier, there is some evidence linking relative deprivation to general political violence (see Ellina and Moore, 1990) . 2 Moreover, a rich qualitative case study literature illustrates that members of economically marginalized ethnic, racial, and social minority groups are prey to radical ideologies, are more likely to support political violence as solution to their problems, and are more likely to be recruited into terrorist activity if they experience severe discrimination. There are many examples of this. Systematic employment, social welfare, and housing discrimination against Catholics in Northern Ireland through the 1960s and 1970s aided Irish Republican Army recruitment efforts and prompted higher levels of terrorist attacks (O'Hearn, 1987) . Formal systems of apartheid and white rule in South Africa and Zimbabwe (Rhodesia), which created high unemployment levels among blacks, helped to mold the early strategies of the African National Congress and the Zimbabwe Africa National Union, which involved terrorist campaigns (Rich, 1984) . Scholars of Latin American politics have maintained that socioeconomic marginalization of indigenous people in countries like Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru is a factor in producing conditions under which terrorism and political violence occurs (see Cleary, 2000) . 3 Finally, studies of Muslims living in Europe draw strong links between experiences of employment discrimination, lack of access to educational opportunities, and social marginalization and terrorism. Both Cesari (2005) and Pauly (2004) demonstrate that socioeconomic marginalization of Muslim youths in France has increased the popularity of radical Islam and its attendant violent jihadist movements both in Europe and abroad, noting that experience of personal economic discrimination was a motivating factor for 9/11 conspirator Zacharias Moussaui. These case studies, in addition to broader theoretical expectations grounded in the relative deprivation literature, lead to the third hypothesis of the study: H 3 : Countries exhibiting economic discrimination against minority groups will experience more terrorism.
Cultural Discrimination and Terrorism
Only some work has been done on the subject of ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious identity grievances as predictors of terrorism. Goodwin (2006) argues that ''revolutionaries'' or ''insurgents'' generally attack what they take to be ''complicitious civilians''-civilians seen by the armed movements to be beneficiary constituents of states that they oppose-with whom they do not share similar languages or religious traditions. Agnew (2010: 1) makes a similar finding: that terrorism is more likely when populations experience ''collective strains'' that are high magnitude, impact noncombatants, are perceived as unjust, and are ''inflicted by significantly more powerful others, including 'complicit' citizens, with whom the members of the strained collectivity have weak ties''. For Agnew, ''otherness'' refers to cultural identity-based perceptions of difference. Fox (1999 Fox ( , 2000 adapts Gurr's basic model to demonstrate how religious and cultural discrimination against minorities produces identity-based grievances that can lead to mobilization and engagement in political violence. Fox (2000 Fox ( , 2002 Fox ( , 2004 uses work by Wentz (1987) to argue that non-material identities, such as religious identity, are fundamental building blocks in the psychological makeup of people, their communities, and their daily lives. When they are threatened through discrimination, very strong grievances are produced which are especially likely to motivate violence. He finds validation in this process, and that it can motivate terrorism in particular, in work by Jurgensmeyer (1993) and Rapoport (1991) .
As was the case for economic discrimination and terrorism, experience of cultural discrimination among minority groups is frequently depicted as a key precipitant of terrorist group formation and terrorist activity in qualitative case studies. A couple of examples: restrictions on Kurdish dress, celebration of traditional holidays, and bans on the use of the Kurdish language in schools and in media in Turkey is commonly cited as a motivator for severe grievances that facilitated the development of the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) terrorist movement in the 1980s and 1990s, while more recent accommodation of Kurdish cultural autonomy by succeeding Turkish governments is credited as an important factor in damping PKK activity (see Ergil, 2000; Uslu, 2007) . A similar process of forced assimilation and repression of Basque cultural autonomy fueled the development and activities of ETA under the Franco dictatorship (Clark, 1984) . Chinese religious and cultural restrictions imposed upon Muslim minority groups in Western China are regarded as an exacerbating factor contributing to Uighur terrorism and the activities of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (Wang, 2003) . Finally, Wiktorowicz (2005) demonstrates, through personal interviews with members of radical Muslim groups in Great Britain, that extremist movements have capitalized on widespread feelings of identity crisis that are the product of discrimination and ethnic exclusion among European-born, relatively well-acculturated Muslims.
This, therefore, leads to the fourth and fifth hypotheses tested in the study:
H 4 : Countries exhibiting religious restrictions against minority groups will experience more terrorism.
H 5 : Countries exhibiting linguistic restrictions against minority groups will experience more terrorism.
Finally, the results of the study can help to shed light on the relative importance or significance of the different types of minority discrimination as precipitants of terrorism. Is it the case that manifestations of minority discrimination that are linked to materialist conceptions of oppression-such as denying minorities the right to freely participate in political life or affording minorities unequal access to job opportunities-are more likely to produce terrorist activity than those included in post-materialist depictions of minority status-such as those denying cultural and religious autonomy or cultural and religious respect to minority groups? To account for this possibility, the study tests the following hypothesis: H 6 : Countries exhibiting political and economic discrimination against minorities are more likely to experience terrorist attacks than countries exhibiting religious or linguistic discrimination against minorities.
Validation of this hypothesis would be consistent with findings in the conflict literature that political factors, in particular stability and accountability of political institutions, and economic factors, including poverty and socioeconomic inequality, are more important predictors of political violence than ethnic, religious or cultural factors (e.g. Fearon and Laitin, 2003) . There are also theoretical reasons to expect that manifestation of identity-based discrimination is a less directly linked precipitant of terrorism. I suspect that of the four types of discrimination that minorities can suffer in society, political and economic discrimination, especially if they are acute, are more intrusive and dislocating than religious or linguistic discrimination. This is primarily due to the different degree of enforceability surrounding political and economic discrimination. In this conception, formal or informal barriers to voting, running for political office, getting a job or securing housing are easier for governments or majorities to implement, apply effectively, and unambiguously sustain than are prohibitions against worship or use of language. The latter two can beand in countries where governments try to ban them, are-subverted by the afflicted groups. This makes political or economic discrimination more provocative.
Analysis
I subject the six hypotheses to a battery of cross-national empirical tests. The study is executed through two types of analyses: a set of multiple regression models and a set of simulations to determine the first difference substantive effects of the four main independent variables in the study. The regression models determine whether or not the general presence of discrimination and specific manifestations of minority discrimination are causally related to the incidence of terrorism. The substantive effects identify which of the specific types have the greatest impact on terrorist activity. The first part of the study executes a set of negative binomial regression estimations on the incidence of aggregated domestic and transnational terrorism occurring within countries using a database that includes country-year observations of 166 countries for the years 1991 to 2006. The latter represent the most complete, chronologically-contiguous time series available for the main independent variables in the study. 4 Due to missing data for some years of observations resulting in list-wise deletion, the number of observations per model ranges from 1,990 to 2,406. 4 Data in the Minorities at Risk Database for the minority discrimination indicators (ECDIS, POLDIS, CULPO1, and CULPO2) are available for the years 1970 and 1981 and then annually for 1991 through 2006. Robustness specifications including observations for 1970 and 1981 produce the same results as those in the main models.
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Since the distribution of values for the dependent variable and incidents of domestic and transnational attacks occurring in a country each year are unevenly distributed spatially and temporally, because the values of dependent variable observations may not, in theory, be independent of one another and because in no case can the dependent variable assume negative values, I employ negative binomial regression models rather than standard ordinary least squares (OLS) models or Poisson count models (see Brandt et al., 2000; Cameron et al., 1998; King, 1988) . Moreover, the results of Vuong tests conducted during robustness checks, explained in detail below, do not indicate that zero-inflated negative binomial estimations are more efficient than negative binomial estimations. I also note that in addition to these justifications, negative binomial models, rather than OLS or other models, have become an industry standard in studies of terrorism (see, for example, Dreher and Gassebner, 2008; Wade and Reiter, 2007; Drakos and Gofas, 2006; Li, 2005) . In all models, I calculate robust standard errors that are clustered on country. The second analytical component of the study uses the Clarify freeware statistical package developed by Tomz et al. (2003) to generate simulated values of the dependent variable-incidents of terrorism-produced by first difference increases in the four types of minority discrimination while holding all covariates in the negative binomial regression constant.
Variables
A list of the variables used in the study along with their descriptions, operationalization, and sources is published in Table 1 . The dependent variable in the study is a country-year tally of all incidents of terrorism occurring within a country and is derived from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) maintained by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. 5 The GTD affords researchers several advantages. It includes counts of domestic terrorism, a type of terrorism that Abadie (2006) notes is woefully under-examined in empirical studies but is a significantly more frequent occurrence than transnational terrorism. The Global Terrorism Database also allows researchers to set inclusion criteria for incidents. In this analysis, I opt to balance minimum and maximum degrees of inclusion in line with the most commonly used definitions of terrorism as defined by Rapoport (2006) . 6 There are five independent variables in the study that operationalize minority group status and experience of discrimination. All of them are derived from data from the Minorities at Risk Database coded by the Minorities at Risk project (2009). Minorities at risk groups are ethnic, linguistic and religious communities in countries that ''collectively suffer or benefit from systematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in society'' (Minorities at Risk Project, 2009: 1). The 
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Minorities at Risk (MAR) database aims to be as comprehensive as possible, collecting data on all prominent minority groups in countries and publishing data on 282 separate minority at risk groups. Because the MAR database publishes its data on a group by group basis, I reshape it to a country-year format for the purposes of this analysis. This leaves many countries with more than one minority at risk group, and it is frequently the case that the groups experience different degrees of discrimination. In these cases, noting that I need to distill all minority group discrimination into a single value for the country-year observation, I adopt the method used by Lai (2007) and Caprioli and Trumbore (2003) and code the highest measurement of discrimination across all national minority groups. In my database, 115 out of 166 countries contain at least one minority at risk community in the average year, and approximately 66.6 percent of all country-years observed contain at least one minority at risk group. After reconfiguring the MAR database to a country-year format, I take four of its indicators-POLDIS, Political Discrimination Index; ECDIS, Economic Discrimination Index; CULPO1, Restrictions on Religion; and CULPO2, Restrictions on Use of Language or Language Instruction-and recode them into the main independent variables of the study. It is necessary to recode these indicators, rather than inserting them raw into the model, for two reasons. First, in the raw, POLDIS and ECDIS are pseudo-categorical indicators rather than clear ordinal scales. The codes of these two variables in MAR are 0, indicating that the minority group in question does not experience political or economic discrimination, 1, indicating that the group suffers from a legacy of discrimination but benefits from official remediation policies, and 2, 3, and 4, indicating increasing degrees of discrimination, exclusion and government neglect, and overt government repression in the highest code. CULPO1 and CULPO2 are more unambiguously ordinal scales: 0 indicates no discrimination, 1 indicates informal discrimination, 2 and 3 indicate somewhat and sharp discrimination and restriction of minority group religious and linguistic rights. Second, reshaping the MAR database to a country-year format creates observations-33.3 percent of all observations in the dataset-without a minority at risk community to code values for. This complicates the 0 code, which is the default code for all cells, for the four MAR discrimination variables; the non-recoded 0 therefore indicates both an observation where minority groups are not discriminated against and observations where there is no minority group to be discriminated against.
My solution is to produce five recoded variables measuring both the presence of minority groups in countries that experience some level of discrimination and the different aspects of minority status vis-à-vis discrimination in countries. The first independent variable is a simple dummy coded 1 for all observations where (1) a minority at risk group is present; and (2) where that minority group experiences some level of any type-political, economic, religious or linguistic-of discrimination. The next four independent variables code, on an ordinal scale, experience and intensity of the specific types of discrimination. These recoded variables, summarized in Table 2 , are built by addressing the two concerns about the raw data: the need to produce a true ordinal scale of minority economic discrimination and the need to address observations lacking a minority at risk group.
The types of minority group discrimination variables are correlated with one another, though not in a uniform manner. Table 3 presents results of Pearson's r correlation coefficients for the four different types of minority discrimination. All of the coefficients are significant, but Minority Political Discrimination and Minority Economic Discrimination are much stronger predictors of one another than they are of Minority Linguistic and Minority Religious Discrimination. Minority Linguistic and Minority Religious Discrimination are significant predictors of one another, but, again, bear smaller coefficients than that for political and economic discrimination against minorities within countries. I discuss more fully the implications of patterns of correlation between the types of discrimination, as well as the possibility of simultaneous effects, in a subsequent section.
In all models I also include an array of standard control variables that are frequently included in empirical studies of terrorism (see, for example, Wade and Reiter, 2007; Li, 2005; Eyerman, 1998) . I include natural logs of gross national income per capita, national population, national geographic area, national GINI coefficients, and the number of years the current political regime has been in power. Noting that Li (2005) found that different aspects of political regime type have different effects on terrorism experienced by a country, I also control for the degree to which a country's executive branch is constrained and level of political (2010) found that countries with poor human rights records experienced more frequent incidents of terrorism, I control for the level of physical integrity rights protections in a country. Summary statistics of all variables are published in Table 4 .
Reverse Causation
All independent variables in the study are lagged one period. This, of course, helps to capture delayed effects of changes in the predictors and further helps to parse out direction of causation. As a further precaution against problems of endogeneity between the discrimination variables and terrorism, I produced a set of ordered logit models testing for a possible relationship between terrorist attacks in t 0 and change in the four types of minority discrimination in t 1 , essentially flipping the main model dependent and independent variables. In none of these checks are terrorist attacks significant predictors of discrimination. This is consistent with the different rates of change over time of the two sets of variables. While counts of terrorist attacks can widely vary from year to year, change in discrimination status is slow and rare in the sample.
Model Results
The results are summarized in Table 5 , revealing some interesting patterns which generally identify economic discrimination-as opposed to political, religious or linguistic discrimination-as the most consistently significant predictor of terrorist attacks in countries. These findings are interesting for a couple of reasons, not the least of which is that they deviate from some of Gurr's findings (1993 Gurr's findings ( , 1996 Gurr's findings ( , 2000 on minority economic discrimination and other forms of political violence, such as rebellion and civil war. 7 First, Model 1 demonstrates that presence of minorities at risk groups that experience some level of discrimination of any kind is a significant positive predictor of terrorism, thus supporting my first hypothesis. When delving deeper, however, it becomes clear that only certain types of discrimination significantly contribute to terrorism. In Model 2, minority group political discrimination is a significant positive predictor of terrorism, and in Model 3 minority group economic discrimination is also a significant positive predictor of terrorism. However, as evidenced in Models 4 and 5, neither religious discrimination nor linguistic discrimination are significant predictors of terrorism at all. Finally, Model 5, which compares the relative effects of all four different types of minority group discrimination, demonstrates that only economic discrimination is a significant predictor of terrorist attacks. Realizing that many countries feature more than one type of minority group discrimination and, in theory, the different types of discrimination may predict one another, I ran traditional collinearity diagnostics. 8 These do not indicate significant multicollinearity distortions and coupled with the findings in Models 2 through 5, where the different types of discrimination are run individually, the conclusion that religious and linguistic discrimination are not significant predictors of terrorism can be reported with confidence. Overall, the results suggest that countries that permit informal or formal discrimination against their minority communities can expect to experience more domestic and transnational terrorist attacks, but that this is conditioned on the type of minority discrimination that prevails in the country. Across all models several of the control variables are significant, many of them at the highest level, demonstrating that the core findings in the analysis-that political and economic discrimination in countries produces more terrorism-is robust to the inclusion of important covariates. The natural log of gross national income per capita is a consistently significant positive predictor of terrorism across 8 Results available from author. Piazza: Types of Minority Discrimination and Terrorism Table 5 . Conflict Management and Peace Science 29 (5) the models, while the GINI coefficient is significant in only some of the models. This suggests that wealthy countries are more likely to experience terrorism than poorer countries-a finding consistent with some of the empirical literature and with the theoretical argument that wealthy countries afford more targeting opportunities for terrorist movements. The argument that terrorism is more likely in countries with uneven distribution of income is not as consistently supported by the results. The results in Table 5 suggest that more populous countries experience more terrorism, which is an expected finding, but in none of the models is the geographic size of the country a significant predictor of terrorism. The covariates in the models also conform to the expectation formed by Li (2005) that mature regimes, measured by Durable, and regimes with high levels of political participation experience significantly less terrorism. However, executive constraints, the other measure of regime type, is not significant. Finally, reproducing the findings of Walsh and Piazza (2010) , in all models countries affording their citizens poor human rights protections (Physical Integrity Rights Index) experience less terrorism.
Robustness Specifications
I conduct a series of robustness checks on the main results and find them to reinforce the main findings of the study that among different types of minority discrimination, economic discrimination is the significant driver of terrorism. The results of these checks, discussed in more detail below, are summarized in Table 6 To check the results produced using the main negative binomial models I first reran the main models using three alternative estimation techniques: (1) zeroinflated negative binomial estimations, in order to account for the possibility of two different types of zero values in the dependent variable; (2) country and yearfixed effects negative binomial estimations, to address omitted variable bias; and (3) rare events logistical regression models, in which the dependent variable is truncated into a dummy coded 1 for any observation in which at least one terrorist attack occurred, to reduce the impact of outliers cases on the overall results. These alternative modeling technique specifications produce mostly the same results as found in the main models of the study. In the zero-inflated models, the exact same pattern is reproduced: economic discrimination against minorities is the only consistently significant positive predictor of terrorism in countries. However, in both the rare-events logit and fixed-effects negative binomial models, both political and economic discrimination are found to be consistently significant, while religious and linguistic discrimination are not. In these models, mere presence of minority groups facing some sort of discrimination is significant, except in the fixed-effects model. While the results of the alternative estimation technique specifications do underscore the main findings, they themselves are marred by limitations. As previously noted, Vuong tests for the zero-inflated models do not demonstrate higher levels of efficiency than standard negative binomial models. The rare-event logits do address the issue of outlier effects in the dependent variable, but they do not cluster on country. Finally, while the fixed effects models do address country and year-specific observation factors that could affect the results, they eliminate Piazza: Types of Minority Discrimination and Terrorism Conflict Management and Peace Science 29 (5) around 15 country cases per model due to lack of variation in one or more indicators. However, taken together they increase confidence that the results of the main models are not dependent on the selection of the modeling technique. I also undertook several other robustness specifications. To determine if the results in the study are driven by extreme, rather than mild, manifestations of minority discrimination I truncated the discrimination indicators into dummy variables and reran the main negative binomial models. Noting also that Li (2005) controlled for previous terrorist activity, I also reran the models including a one-year lagged measure of attacks on the right-hand side of the equation. 9 To determine whether or not the effects of minority discrimination mostly drive domestic, as opposed to transnational, terrorism I also reran the models using data on domestic terrorism derived from Enders et al.'s (2011) database of transnational and domestic terrorist attacks decomposed from the Global Terrorism Database. Gurr (1993 Gurr ( , 1996 Gurr ( , 2000 found ethnic minority group legacy of separatism to be a significant predictor of violent conflict in countries, so as a further check I have also rerun the main models including the Minorities at Risk index of separatism (SEPX) as a control. Finally, noting the potential limitations associated with aggregating acuteness levels of minority discrimination to the country-year level for countries containing more than one minority at risk group-the technique that Lai (2007) and Caprioli and Trumbore (2003) use but a larger research design issue raised by Young and Finley (2011) and Rustad et al. (2011) -I also reran the models including a count variable for the number of minority groups within the country. In all of these robustness specifications, the same results as those featured in the main analysis are reproduced.
Simultaneous Effects
As previously noted, the different types of minority discrimination are correlates of one another. Furthermore, minority at risk groups in countries are frequently afflicted by multiple types of discrimination: in 22.1% of observations in the data, minority groups experience two types of discrimination; in 8.4% of observations they experience three types and in 2.4 percent they experience all four. This could potentially complicate interpretation of the main results if different types of discrimination affect one another. To shed light on this possible complication, I pair together the four different measures of minority discrimination-political, economic, religious, and linguistic-in all possible two, three, and four grouping combinations and create ten new dummy variables. I then rerun these as predictors of terrorism using the same covariates as in the main models. The coefficients for these models-coefficients for the other covariates are not reported for simplicity-are presented in Table 7 .
None of the combinations of types of discrimination are found to be significant predictors of terrorism, at least using the standard .05 p-value level threshold. Only one of the combined discrimination dummy variables, Political and Economic Discrimination, approaches significance with a p-value of .104 (z = 1.62). This later finding provides a good test of Hypothesis 6-that countries exhibiting ''traditional-materialist'' minority discrimination, like economic and political discrimination, are more likely to experience terrorism than those exhibiting ''post-materialist'' minority discrimination like religious or cultural discrimination-but, given the marginal significance of the coefficient, produces rather weak results. 10 Taken along with the results of Model 7 in the main analysis presented in Table 5 which demonstrate that when pooled together in the same model only economic discrimination is a significant predictor of terrorism, these results suggest that the types of discrimination affecting minorities bear distinct effects on patterns of terrorism within countries, and that their specific impacts are seen in isolation rather than in simultaneous effects. Of the types of discrimination coded by Minorities at Risk, it is economic discrimination that is the strong and consistent precipitant of terrorist activity. Table 8 reports the substantive effects of discrimination on terrorism. These are produced using Monte Carlo simulations of the expected effects of first-difference changes in the intensity level of discrimination on terrorist attacks. The patterns revealed in the simulations are consistent with the main model results and help to elucidate the nature of the relationship between discrimination and terrorism. First, Table 8 demonstrates that an increase in intensity of discrimination does not bear a uniform effect on amount of terrorism produced across the types of discrimination. While average one-intensity-level increases in economic and political discrimination produce higher levels of terrorist attacks, increases in religious and linguistic discrimination have mixed effects. Indeed, the confidence interval / error estimates for terrorist attacks produced by increasing religious and linguistic discrimination dip into the negative range. This further suggests that these two manifestations of minority discrimination are not clearly linked to higher propensity for terrorist activity.
Substantive Effects
Second, Table 8 clearly demonstrates that between political and economic discrimination against minorities, it is the former that is the more substantive driver of terrorism. An average one-level-increase in the intensity of political discrimination suffered by minorities produces, in the simulations, just 0.6 more attacks while a similar increase of economic discrimination produces nearly 1.5 more incidents 10 However, when a combined political and economic minority discrimination dummy variable and a combined religious and linguistic minority discrimination dummy variable are run together in the same model, with all covariates, the political-economic discrimination indicator is a significant (p .05) positive predictor of terrorism, while the religiouslinguistic discrimination variable is not. This perhaps further suggests support for Hypothesis 6, but is inconsistent with other specifications, namely those showing marginal significance when political-economic discrimination is run alone with covariates.
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Conclusion
The overall findings of this study, that discrimination against minorities in countries is positively associated with higher levels of terrorist attacks, but that this relationship is confined to and most evident in economic, and to a lesser degree political, discrimination rather than religious and linguistic discrimination, are highly preliminary and they recommend further investigation. In particular, while the study shows that countries featuring discrimination, specifically economic discrimination, against minority groups are more likely to produce and sustain terrorist attacks, they do not explain the mechanisms of the relationship between discrimination and terrorism. They, therefore, do not shed light on which component of the theoretical argument prevalent in the literature-alienation and social exclusion, construction of grievances, opportunities to mobilize, etc.-is the empirically substantiated explanation linking discrimination to terrorism. One of the key problems is that the measurements used in the analysis are still overaggregated. Future studies that are able to ''drill-down'' to the subnational group or individual levels might be better able to establish a more satisfactory explanation of how the experience of generalized or economic discrimination propels individuals to join terrorist groups or support terrorism. Despite this, the results of the study are striking given the direction that the ''root causes'' of terrorism literature has taken after the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. Generally speaking, as scholars have failed to establish consistent and unambiguous statistical links between democratic rule, poverty, and socioeconomic inequality and terrorism, indicators of individuals' economic statuses have taken a back seat to religion and cultural identity, as potential predictors of terrorism (see Moore, 2008 for a brief survey of these trends). The results of this study suggest that a reconsideration of more nuanced or targeted measurements of political opportunities available to all segments of society and economic status or inequality as root causes of terrorism are in order. This recommendation is consistent with qualitative research on root causes of terrorism Monte Carlo simulations of first-difference expected values using Clarify software package (Tomz et al., 2003) .
Conflict Management and Peace Science 29 (5) conducted by scholars like Von Hippel (2009) who argue that quantitative studies that fail to find a link between economic conditions and terrorism have cast too narrow a net and have not fully examined the often indirect process by which economic deprivation leads to radicalization and the creation of a lucrative pool of recruits for terrorist movements in places like Pakistan and Afghanistan. Finally, as noted by Rustad et al. (2011) and Young and Findley (2011) , crossnational analysis using highly aggregated measurements of country features are the norm in the current generation-2001 to present-of empirical studies investigating the root causes of terrorism. Young and Findley argue that this methodological tendency is really more of a product of data convenience, as much of the statistical data used in the earlier conflict literature relied on aggregate measurements denominated in country-year format, rather than growing out of a serious consideration of whether or not root causes of terrorism may register at the national level. This study suggests that the next generation of quantitative terrorism studies should differentiate the effects of features of marginal actors within society on patterns of terrorism rather than the mean or modal actor, which is more likely to be accurately captured in aggregate national statistics.
